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Jinsong Hu, Shihao Yan, Xiangyun Zhou, Feng Shu, Jun Li, and Jiangzhou Wang
Abstract—Covert wireless communication aims to hide the very
existence of wireless transmissions in order to guarantee a strong
security in wireless networks. In this work, we examine the
possibility and achievable performance of covert communication
in amplify-and-forward one-way relay networks. Specifically, the
relay is greedy and opportunistically transmits its own informa-
tion to the destination covertly on top of forwarding the source’s
message, while the source tries to detect this covert transmission
to discover the illegitimate usage of the resource (e.g., power,
spectrum) allocated only for the purpose of forwarding the
source’s information. We propose two strategies for the relay to
transmit its covert information, namely rate-control and power-
control the transmission schemes, for which the source’s detection
limits are analysed in terms of detection error probability and the
achievable effective covert rates from the relay to destination are
derived. Our examination determines the conditions under which
the rate-control transmission scheme outperforms the power-
control transmission scheme, and vice versa, which enables the
relay to achieve the maximum effective covert rate. Our analysis
indicates that the relay has to forward the source’s message
to shield its covert transmission and the effective covert rate
increases with its forwarding ability (e.g., its maximum transmit
power).
Index Terms—Physical layer security, covert communication,
wireless relay networks, detection, transmission schemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Related Works
Security and privacy are critical in existing and future wire-
less networks since a large amount of confidential information
(e.g., credit card information, physiological information for
e-health) is transferred over the open wireless medium [2]–
[4]. Traditional security techniques offer protection against
eavesdropping through encryption, guaranteeing the integrity
of messages over the air [5], [6]. However, it has been shown
in the recent years that even the most robust encryption tech-
niques can be defeated by a determined adversary. Physical-
layer security, on the other hand, exploits the dynamic charac-
teristics of the wireless medium to minimize the information
obtained by eavesdroppers [7]–[11]. However, it does not
provide protection against the detection of a transmission in
the first place, which can offer an even stronger level of
security, as the transmission of encrypted transmission can
spark suspicion in the first place and invite further probing
by skeptical eavesdroppers. On the contrary, apart from pro-
tecting the content of communication, covert communication
aims to enable a wireless transmission between two users
while guaranteeing a negligible detection probability of this
transmission at a warden and thus achieving privacy of the
transmitter. Meanwhile, this strong security (i.e., hiding the
wireless transmission) is desired in many application scenarios
of wireless communications, such as covert military oper-
ations, location tracking in vehicular ad hoc networks and
intercommunication of sensor networks or Internet of Things
(IoT). Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, the
security and privacy of wireless communications has been an
ever-increasing concern, which now is the biggest barrier to the
wide-spread adoption of sensor networks or IoT technologies
[12]. In sensor networks or IoT, multiple hidden transmit-
ters or receivers, which may be surrounded or monitored
by wardens/cybercriminals, are trying to exchange critical
information through multi-hop wireless transmissions. Each
transmission should be kept covert to enable the end-to-end
covert communication in order to guarantee the ‘invisibility’
of the transmitters. As such, the hiding of communication
termed covert communication or low probability of detection
communication, which aims to shield the very existence of
wireless transmissions against a warden to achieve security,
has recently drawn significant research interests and is emerg-
ing as a cutting-edge technique in the context of wireless
communication security [13]–[15].
Although spread-spectrum techniques are widely used to
achieve covertness in military applications of wireless commu-
2nications [16], many fundamental problems have not been well
addressed. This leads to the fact that the probability that the
spread-spectrum techniques fail to hide wireless transmissions
is unknown, significantly limiting its application. The funda-
mental limit of covert communication has been studied under
various channel conditions, such as additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channels [17], binary symmetric channels [18],
discrete memoryless channels [19], and multiple input multi-
ple output (MIMO) AWGN channels [20]. It is proved that
O(√n) bits of information can be transmitted to a legitimate
receiver reliably and covertly in n channel uses as n → ∞.
This means that the associated covert rate is zero due to
limn→∞O(√n)/n → 0. Following these pioneering works
on covert communication, a positive rate has been proved to
be achievable when the warden has uncertainty on his receiver
noise power [21], [22], or an uniformed jammer comes in to
help [23]. Most recently, [24] has examined the impact of
noise uncertainty on covert communication. In addition, the
effect of the imperfect channel state information (CSI) and
finite blocklength (i.e., finite n) on covert communication has
been investigated in [25] and [26], respectively.
B. Motivation and Our Contributions
The ultimate goal of covert wireless communication is to
establish shadow wireless networks [14], in which each hop
transmission should be kept covert to enable the end-to-end
covert communication, in order to guarantee the “invisibility”
of the transmitters. Following the previous works that only
focused on covert transmissions in point-to-point communi-
cation scenarios, in this work, for the first time, we consider
covert communications in the context of amplify-and-forward
one-way relay networks. This is motivated by the scenario
where the relay (R) tries to transmit its own information to
the destination (D) on top of forwarding the information from
the source (S) to D. Specifically, for example, in some relay
networks (possible application scenarios of sensor networks
or IoT) the communication resources (e.g., spectrum, power)
can be managed or owned by S, where S may not allow
R to transmit its own information on top of forwarding S’s
messages to D. This is due to the fact that R’s additional trans-
mission may cause interference within the specific spectrum
owned/managed by S and also consume more transmit power,
which is possibly wirelessly transferred from S (owned by
S) and should be only used for forwarding S’s information.
Therefore, this additional transmission of R should be kept
covert from S.
We note that conceptually the covert transmission from R
to D is similar to steganography, in which covert information
is transmitted by hiding in innocuous objects [27]. These
innocuous objects are utilized as “cover text” to carry the
covert information. In our work, the innocuous objects are the
forwarding transmissions from R to D. The main difference
between our work and steganography is that in our work the
covert information is shielded by the forwarding transmissions
from R to D at the physical layer, while in steganography the
covert information is hidden and transmitted by encoding or
modifying some contents (e.g., shared videos or images) at
the application layer (as discussed in Section III of [14]).
In the literature, covert communications with positive trans-
mission rate are achieved in the context of point-to-point
systems by considering different uncertainty sources, such as
random received noise power [22], random jamming signals
[23], and imperfect CSI [25]. In the considered relay networks,
as mentioned above the uncertainty is inherently embedded in
the forwarding strategies of the S’s information from R to
D, where the covert transmission with a positive rate from
R to D does not require any extra uncertainty sources. The
performance of the considered covert communication in relay
networks and the covert communication in other point-to-
point communication systems highly depends on the amount of
uncertainty appeared in the system model. As such, it is hard to
compare the achieved covert rate limits or warden’s detection
limits directly, since the uncertainty sources are different and
it is hard to quantify the corresponding amount of uncertainty
in the same manner.
Our main contributions are summarized below.
• We examine the possibility and achievable performance
of covert communications in one-way relay networks.
Specifically, we propose two strategies for R to transmit
the covert information to D, namely the rate-control and
power-control transmission schemes, in which the trans-
mission rate and transmit power of the covert message
are fixed and to be optimized regardless of the channel
quality from R to D, respectively. We also identify the
necessary conditions that the covert transmission from
R to D can possibly occur without being detected by S
with probability one and clarify how R hides its covert
transmission in forwarding S’s message to D in these two
schemes.
• We derive the detection limits at S in terms of the
prior probability of null hypothesis 1 − ω, the prior
probability of alternative hypothesis ω, the false alarm
rate α and miss detection rate β are in closed-from
expressions for the proposed two transmission schemes.
Then, we determine the optimal detection threshold at
S, which minimizes the detection error probability ξ =
(1 − ω)α + ωβ and obtain the associated minimum
detection error probability ξ∗. Our analysis leads to many
useful insights. For example, we analytically prove that
ξ∗ increases with R’s maximum transmit power, which
indicates that boosting the forwarding ability of R also
increases its capacity to perform covert transmissions.
This demonstrates a tradeoff between the achievable
effective covert rate and R’s ability to aid the transmission
from S to D.
• We analyze the effective covert rates achieved by these
two schemes subject to the covert constraint ξ∗ ≥
min(1 − ω, ω) − ǫ, where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is predetermined
to specify the covert constraint. Our analysis indicates
that the achievable effective covert rate approaches zero
as the transmission rate from S to D approaches zero,
which demonstrates that covert transmission from R to
D is only feasible with the legitimate transmission from
S to D as the shield. Our examination shows that the
rate-control transmission scheme outperforms the power-
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Fig. 1. Covert communication in one-way relay networks.
control transmission scheme under some specific con-
ditions, and vise versa. Our examination enables R to
switch between these two schemes in order to achieve a
higher effective covert rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details our system model and adopted assumptions. Section III
and IV present the rate-control and power-control transmission
schemes, respectively. Thorough analysis on the performance
of these two transmission are provided in these two sections
as well. Section V provides numerical results to confirm our
analysis and provide useful insights on the impact of some
parameters. Section VI draws conclusions.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors is denoted by lower-case boldface symbols. Given a
complex number, | · | denotes the modulus. Given a complex
vector, (·)† denotes the conjugate transpose. E[·] denotes
expectation operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, in this work we consider a one-way
relay network, in which S transmits information to D with
the aid of R, since a direct link from S to D is not available.
As mentioned in the introduction, S allocates some resource
to R in order to seek its help to relay the message to D.
However, in some scenarios R may intend to use this resource
to transmit its own message to D as well, which is forbidden
by S and thus should be kept covert from S. As such, in
the considered system model S is also the warden to detect
whether R transmits its own information to D when it is aiding
the transmission from S to D.
We assume the wireless channels within our system model
are subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading with
equal block length and the channel coefficients are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-
variance. We also assume that each node is equipped with a
single antenna. The channel from S to R is denoted by hsr
and the channel from R to D is denoted by hrd. We assume
R knows both hsr and hrd perfectly, while S only knows
hsr and D only knows hrd. Considering channel reciprocity,
we assume the channel from R to S (denoted by hrs) is the
same as hsr and thus it is perfectly known by S. We further
assume that R operates in the half-duplex mode and thus the
transmission from S to D occurs in two phases: phase 1 (S
transmits to R) and phase 2 (R transmits to D).
B. Transmission from Source to Relay (Phase 1)
In phase 1, the received signal at R is given by
yr[i] =
√
Pshsrxb[i] + nr[i], (1)
where Ps is the fixed transmit power of S, xb is the transmitted
signal by S satisfying E[xb[i]x
†
b[i]] = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n is the
index of each channel use (n is the total number of channel
uses in each phase), and nr[i] is the AWGN at relay with σ
2
r as
its variance, i.e., nr[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2r). In the literature, multiple
approaches have been developed to estimate the noise variance
at a receiver. In general, these approaches can be divided
into two major categories: data-aided (DA) approaches and
non-data-aided (NDA) approaches [28]. The DA approaches
assume that transmitted symbols are known at the receiver
and maximum-likelihood estimation can be used to estimate
the noise variance. For the NDA approaches, transmit symbols
are unknown at the receiver and the noise variance is based on
the statistics of the received signals. In this work, we consider
that R operates in the AF mode and thus R will forward a
linearly amplified version of the received signal to D in phase
2. As such, the forwarded (transmitted) signal by R is given
by
xr[i] = Gyr[i] = G(
√
Pshsrxb[i] + nr[i]), (2)
which is a linear scaled version of the received signal by a
scalar G. In order to guarantee the power constraint at R, the
value of G is chosen such that E[xr[i]x
†
r[i]] = 1, which leads
to G = 1/
√
Ps|hsr|2 + σ2r .
In this work, we also consider that the transmission rate
from S to D is predetermined, which is denoted by Rsd. We
also consider a maximum power constraint at R, i.e., Pr ≤
Pmaxr . As such, although R knows both hsr and hrd perfectly,
transmission outage from S to D still incurs when Cmaxsd <
Rsd, where C
max
sd is the channel capacity from S to D for
Pr = P
max
r . Then, the transmission outage probability is given
by δ = P [Cmaxsd < Rsd], which has been derived in a closed-
form expression [29]. We assume that all the nodes in the
network do not transmit signals when the outage occurs. In
practice, the pair of Rsd and δ determines the specific aid
(i.e., the value of Pmaxr ) required by S from R, which relates
to the amount of resource allocated to R by S as a payback.
In this work, we assume both Rsd and δ are predetermined,
which leads to a predetermined Pmaxr .
C. Transmission Strategies at Relay (Phase 2)
In this subsection, we detail the transmission strategies of R
when it does and does not transmit its own information to D.
We also determine the condition that R can transmit its own
message to D without being detected by S with probability
one, in which the probability to guarantee this condition is
also derived.
1) Relay’s Transmission without the Covert Message: In the
case when the relay does not transmit its own message (i.e.,
covert message) to D, it only transmits xr to D. Accordingly,
the received signal at D is given by
yd[i] =
√
P 0r hrdxr[i] + nd[i]
=
√
P 0rGhrd
√
Pshsrxb[i] +
√
P 0rGhrdnr[i] + nd[i], (3)
4where P 0r is the transmit power of xr at R in this case and
nd[i] is the AWGN at D with σ
2
d as its variance, i.e., nd[i] ∼
CN (0, σ2d). Accordingly, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
destination for xb, which has been derived in a closed-form
expression in [30], is given by
γd =
Ps|hsr|2P 0r |hrd|2G2
P 0r |hrd|2G2σ2r + σ2d
=
γ1γ2
γ1 + γ2 + 1
, (4)
where γ1 , (Ps|hsr|2)/σ2r , γ2 , (P 0r |hrd|2)/σ2d, and the
scalar G is defined earlier as G = 1/
√
Ps|hsr|2 + σ2r .
For a predetermined Rsd, R does not have to adopt the
maximum transmit power for each channel realization in order
to guarantee a specific transmission outage probability. When
the transmission outage occurs (i.e., Cmaxsd < Rsd occurs), R
will not transmit (i.e., P 0r = 0). When C
max
sd ≥ Rsd, R only
has to ensure Csd = Rsd, where Csd = 1/2 log2(1+γd). Then,
following (4) the transmit power of R when Cmaxsd ≥ Rsd is
given by P 0r = µσ
2
d/|hrd|2, where
µ ,
(Ps|hsr|2 + σ2r )(22Rsd − 1)
[Ps|hsr|2 − σ2r (22Rsd − 1)]
. (5)
We note that (5) indicates that R does not use its maximum
transmit power Pmaxr to forward S’s information when it does
not transmit covert information to D. This is due to the fact that
the transmission from S to D is of a fixed rate Rsd and a larger
transmit power that leads to Csd > Rsd (not Csd = Rsd) does
not bring in extra benefit to this transmission from S to D. As
such, in order to save energy R only sets its transmit power
as per (5) to guarantee Csd = Rsd. Noting γd < γ1, we have
1/2 log2(1 + γ1) > Rsd when Csd = Rsd. As such, µ given
in (5) is nonnegative. Following (4), we note that C∗sd ≥ Rsd
requires |hrd|2 ≥ µσ2d/Pmaxr . As such, the transmit power of
R without a covert message is given by
P 0r =


µσ2d
|hrd|2
, |hrd|2 ≥ µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
,
0, |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
.
(6)
As per (6), we note that relay will forward message when
|hrd|2 ≥ µσ2d/Pmaxr is met. We denote this necessary condi-
tion as B. As such, R will forward xb to D and S will perform
detection whenever condition B is met. Considering quasi-
static Rayleigh fading, the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of |hrd|2 is given by F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x and thus
the probability that B is guaranteed is given by
PB = exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
}
. (7)
2) Relay’s Transmission with the Covert Message: In the
case when R transmits the covert message to D on top of
forwarding xb, the received signal at D is given by
yd[i] =
√
P 1rGhrd
√
Pshsrxb[i] +
√
P∆hrdxc[i]+√
P 1rGhrdnr[i] + nd[i], (8)
where P 1r is R’s transmit power of xb in this case and P∆
is R’s transmit power of the covert message xc satisfying
E[xc[i]x
†
c[i]] = 1. We note that the covert transmission from
R to D should not affect the transmission from S to D.
Otherwise, S can easily observe this covert transmission. As
such, here we assume D always first decodes xb with xc
as interference. Following (8), the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) for xb is given by
γd =
Ps|hsr|2P 1r |hrd|2G2
P 1r |hrd|2G2σ2r + P∆|hrd|2 + σ2d
=
γ1γ3
γ3 + (γ1 + 1) (γ3P∆/P 1r + 1)
, (9)
where γ3 , (P 1r |hrd|2)/σ2d. We will determine P 1r based on
different transmission strategies of the covert message from R
to D.
D. Decoding of the Covert Message
As discussed above, the covert transmission from R to D
should not affect the transmission from S to D and thus
we have to guarantee the successful decoding of xb even
when xc is treated as interference to xb. We also note that
this covert transmission cannot happen when the transmission
outage from S to D occurs. This is, for example, due to the
fact that when the transmission outage occurs R will request
a retransmission from S, which enables S to detect R’s covert
transmission with probability one if the covert transmission
happened. Therefore, the covert transmission from R to D
only occur when the successful transmission from S to D is
guaranteed (i.e., when xb is successfully decoded at D). As
such, when the covert message is transmitted by R, successive
interference cancellation (SIC) that allows a receiver to decode
different signals that arrive simultaneously is implemented at
D. Taking advantage of SIC, D decodes the stronger signal
(i.e., xb) first, subtracts it from the combined signal yd given
in (8), and finally decodes the weaker one (i.e., xc) from the
residue. We also note that D cannot jointly decode xb and xc
due to the fact that the codebooks used for encoding xb and
xc are different in order to guarantee that the codebook for
xc is unknown while the codebook for xb is known to the S.
Hence, the effective received signal used to decode the covert
message xc is given by
y˜d[i] =
√
P∆hrdxc[i] +
√
P 1r hrdGnr[i] + nd[i]. (10)
Then, following (10) the SINR for xc is
γ∆ =
P∆|hrd|2
P 1r |hrd|2G2σ2r + σ2d
. (11)
E. Binary Detection at Source and the Covert Constraint
In this subsection, we present the optimal detection strategy
adopted by S (i.e., Source).
In phase 2 when R transmits to D, S will detect whether
R transmits the covert message xc on top of forwarding S’s
message xb to D. R does not transmit xc in the null hypothesis
5H0 while it does in the alternative hypothesis H1. Then, the
received signal at S in phase 2 is given by
ys[i] =
{ √
P 0r hrsxr [i]+ns[i], H0,√
P 1r hrsxr [i]+
√
P∆hrsxc[i]+ns[i], H1,
=


√
P 0r hrs√
Ps|hsr|2+σ2r
(
√
Pshsrxb[i]+nr[i])+ns[i], H0,√
P 1r hrs√
Ps|hsr|2+σ2r
(
√
Pshsrxb[i]+
nr[i])+
√
P∆hrsxc[i]+ns[i], H1.
(12)
Noting that xb[i] is known by S, hence, S can cancel the
corresponding component from its received signal ys[i], due
to the fact the infinite blocklength is considered in this work
and S can exactly estimate the scale factor of xb[i]. Then, the
effective received signal used for detection at S is given by
y˜s[i]=


√
P 0r hrs√
Ps|hsr|2+σ2r
nr[i]+ns[i], H0,√
P 1r hrs√
Ps|hsr|2+σ2r
nr[i]+
√
P∆hrsxc[i]+ns[i], H1.
(13)
Following (13), the probability density functions of the obser-
vations y˜s under H0 and H1 are, respectively, given by
f(y˜s
∣∣H0) = n∏
i=1
f(y˜s[i]
∣∣H0)
=
1(
2πσ2H0
)n
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2H0
n∑
i=1
|y˜s[i]|2
}
, (14)
f(y˜s
∣∣H1) = n∏
i=1
f(y˜s[i]
∣∣H1)
=
1(
2πσ2H1
)n
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2H1
n∑
i=1
|y˜s[i]|2
}
, (15)
where σ2H0 , P
0
r |hrs|2σ2r/(Ps|hsr|2+σ2r)+σ2s and σ2H1 ,
P 1r |hrs|2σ2r/(Ps|hsr|2+σ2r)+P∆|hrs|2+σ2s . Following (14) and
(15), based on the Fisher-Neyman factorization theorem [31],
we note that the term T (n) =
∑n
i=1 |y˜s[i]|2 is the sufficient
test statistic for the detector at S. As such, the detector at S
for an arbitrary threshold is given by
1
n
T (n)
D1
≷
D0
τ, (16)
where τ is the threshold for (1/n)T (n), which will be deter-
mined later, D1 and D0 are the binary decisions that infer
whether R transmits covert message or not, respectively. We
will examine how S sets the optimal value of τ in order to min-
imize the detection error probability in the following sections
for considered different transmission strategies. Considering
infinite blocklength, i.e., n→∞, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
T (n)=
{
P 0r |hrs|2φ+ σ2s , H0,
P 1r |hrs|2φ+ P∆|hrs|2+σ2s , H1,
(17)
where φ , σ2r/(Ps|hsr|2 + σ2r ).
The detection performance of S is normally measured by
its detection error probability, which is defined as
ξ , (1− ω)α+ ωβ, (18)
where ω = P(H1) is the probability that R transmits a covert
message, 1 − ω = P(H0) is the probability that R does not
transmit a covert message, α = P(D1|H0) is S’s false alarm
rate, and β = P(D0|H1) is S’s miss detection rate.
In practice, it is hard to know ξ at R since the threshold
τ adopted by S is unknown. In this work, we consider the
worst-case scenario where τ is optimized at S to minimize
ξ. As such, the covert constraint considered in this work is
ξ∗ ≥ min{1− ω, ω} − ǫ, where ξ∗ is the minimum detection
error probability achieved at S.
III. RATE-CONTROL TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In this section, we consider the rate-control transmission
scheme, in which R transmits a covert message to D with
a constant rate when some specific realizations of |hrd|2 are
guaranteed. To this end, R varies its transmit power as per
hrd such that P∆|hrd|2 is fixed as Q. Specifically, we first
determine R’s transmit power in H1 and then analyze the
detection error probability at S, based on which we also derive
S’s optimal detection threshold. Furthermore, we derive the
effective covert rate achieved by the rate-control transmission
scheme.
A. Transmit Power at Relay under H1
Following (9) and defining Q = P∆|hrd|2, in order to
guarantee Csd = Rsd under H1, P 1r is given as
P 1r =
µ(Q+ σ2d)
|hrd|2 , (19)
which requires C∗sd ≥ Rsd that leads to |hrd|2 ≥ (µσ2d +
µQ+Q)/Pmaxr . We note that P
1
r is the transmit power of the
relay to forward the signal from S to D. In practical scenario,
R can set the value of P 1r as per the system parameters hsr,
hrd, Ps, σ
2
r , σ
2
d , Rsd, and Q. The values of these system
parameters are known by R. Specifically, hsr can hrd can be
obtained through channel estimations. The values of σ2r and
σ2d can be achieved through a priori measurements collected
from the environment, where σ2d is fed back from D to R.
The value of Rsd is predetermined by the QoS requirement
of the communication from S to D, while the value of Q is a
design parameter to determine at R. Considering the maximum
power constraint at R (i.e., P 1r +P∆ ≤ Pmaxr under this case),
R has to give up the transmission of the covert message (i.e.,
P∆ = 0) when P
1
r > P
max
r −P∆ and sets P 1r the same as P 0r
given in (6). This is due to the fact that S knows hrs and it
can detect with probability one when the total transmit power
of R is greater than Pmaxr . Then, the transmit power of xr
under H1 for the rate-control transmission scheme is given by
P 1r =


µ(Q+σ2d)
|hrd|2
, |hrd|2 ≥ µσ
2
d+µQ+Q
Pmaxr
,
µσ2d
|hrd|2
,
µσ2d
Pmaxr
≤ |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d+µQ+Q
Pmaxr
,
0, |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
.
(20)
6As per (20), when R cannot support the transmission from
S to D (i.e., when |hrd|2 < µσ2d/Pmaxr ), R or D will send
the retransmission request to S and R should not forward xb,
since this forwarding will definitely fail. In the meantime, S is
aware of that the received energy comes from the R’s covert
transmission if R has transmitted the covert message during
this period. Due to that the CSI of all the channels is available
to R, R knows exactly when the transmission outage from R
to D occurs and thus R will not transmit covert information
to D when this outage occurs. In summary, S cannot detect
R’s covert transmission with probability one only when the
condition |hrd|2 ≥ (µσ2d +µQ+Q)/Pmaxr is guaranteed. We
denote this necessary condition for covert communication as
C. Considering quasi-static Rayleigh fading, the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of |hrd|2 is given by F|hrd|2(x) =
1− e−x and thus the probability that C is guaranteed is given
by
PC = exp
{
−µσ
2
d + µQ+Q
Pmaxr
}
. (21)
We note that PC is a monotonically decreasing function of
Q, which indicates that the probability that R will transmit a
covert message decreases as Q increases.
In this work, we consider quasi-static Rayleigh fading
channels where the channels remain constant within each
transmission period and vary independently from one period
to another. We would like to clarify that R could possibly
transmit a covert message to D without being detected during
a retransmission from S to D (i.e., new transmission period)
when the condition C is met.
B. Detection Error Probability at Source
In this subsection, we derive S’s false alarm rate, i.e., α,
and miss detection rate, i.e., β.
Theorem 1: When the condition B is guaranteed, for a given
τ , the false alarm and miss detection rates at S are derived as
α =


1, τ < σ2s ,
1− P−1B κ1(τ), σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ1,
0, τ > ρ1,
(22)
β =


0, τ < σ2s ,
P−1B κ2(τ), σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ2,
1, τ > ρ2,
(23)
where
ρ1 , Pmaxr |hrs|2φ+ σ2s , (24)
ρ2 , Pmaxr |hrs|2
(
φ+
(φµ + 1)Q
µσ2d
)
+ σ2s ,
κ1(τ) , exp
{
−φµσ
2
d|hrs|2
τ − σ2s
}
,
κ2(τ) , exp
{
−
(
φµσ2d + (φµ+ 1)Q
) |hrs|2
τ − σ2s
}
.
Proof: Considering the maximum power constraint at R
under H0 (i.e., P 0r ≤ Pmaxr ) and following (6), (16), and (17),
the false alarm rate under the condition B is given by
α = P
[
µσ2d
|hrd|2 |hrs|
2φ+ σ2s ≥ τ
∣∣B]
=


1, τ < σ2s ,
P
[
µσ2d
Pmaxr
≤ |hrd|2 ≤ µσ
2
d|hrs|
2φ
τ−σ2s
]
P−1B , σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ1,
0, τ > ρ1.
(25)
Then, substituting F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x into the above
equation (hrs is perfectly known by S and thus it is not a
random variable here) we achieve the desired result in (22).
Considering the maximum power constraint at R under H1
(i.e., P 1r + P∆ ≤ Pmaxr ) and following (16), (17), and (20),
the miss detection rate under the condition B is given by
β = P
[
µ(Q+ σ2d)|hrs|2φ
|hrd|2 +
Q|hrs|2
|hrd|2 + σ
2
s < τ
∣∣B]
=


0, τ < σ2s ,
P
[
|hrd|2≥ (φµ(σ
2
d+Q)+Q)|hrs|
2
τ−σ2s
]
P−1B , σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ2,
1, τ > ρ2.
(26)
Then, substituting F|hrd|2(x) = 1− e−x into (26) we achieve
the desired result in (23).
We note that the false alarm and miss detection rates given
in Theorem 1 are functions of the threshold τ and we next
examine how S sets the value of τ to minimize its detection
error probability in the following subsection.
C. Optimization of the Detection Threshold at Source
In this subsection, we derive the optimal value of the detec-
tion threshold τ that minimizes the detection error probability
ξ for the rate-control transmission scheme.
Theorem 2: The optimal threshold that minimizes ξ for the
rate-control transmission scheme is given by
τ∗ =
{
ρ1, τ
‡ ≤ σ2s ,
min
{
τ‡, ρ1
}
, τ‡ > σ2s ,
(27)
where
τ‡ ,
(φµ+ 1)Q|hrs|2
ln
(
ω1
1−ω1
(
1 + (φµ+1)Q
φµσ2
d
)) + σ2s , (28)
ω1 ,
1
2
exp
{
− (µ+ 1)Q
Pmaxr
}
. (29)
Proof: As discussed before, S will perform detection
whenever condition B is met and R can transmit covert
message when condition C is guaranteed. In our work, we
assume that R will transmit a covert message with probability
50% when C is true. As per (7) and (21), the probability
P(H1) is given by
P(H1) = 1
2
P [C∣∣B] = ω1. (30)
7Then, P(H0) is given by
P(H0) = 1− P(H1) = 1− ω1. (31)
Since ρ2 > ρ1 as given in Theorem 1, following (22) and
(23), we have the detection error probability at S as
ξ =


1− ω1, τ ≤ σ2s ,
1−ω1−P−1B [(1−ω1)κ1(τ)−
ω1κ2(τ)], σ
2
s < τ ≤ ρ1,
ω1P−1B κ2(τ), ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ2,
ω1, τ ≥ ρ2.
(32)
We first note that ξ = 1 − ω1 or ω1 are the worst case
for S and thus S does not set τ ≤ σ2s or τ > ρ2. Following
(32), we derive the first derivative of ξ with respect to τ when
ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ2 as
∂(ξ)
∂τ
=
ω1P−1B
(
φµ
(
σ2d +Q
)
+Q
) |hrs|2
(τ − σ2s)2
κ2(τ) > 0. (33)
This demonstrates that ξ is an increasing function of τ when
ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ2. Thus, S will set ρ1 as the threshold to minimize
ξ if ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ2. We next derive the first derivative of ξ with
respect to τ for σ2s < τ ≤ ρ1 as
∂(ξ)
∂τ
=
P−1B |hrs|2
(τ − σ2s )2
[
ω1
(
φµ
(
σ2d +Q
)
+Q
)
κ2(τ)−
(1− ω1)φµσ2dκ1(τ)
]
=
ω1P−1B
(
φµ
(
σ2d +Q
)
+Q
) |hrs|2κ2(τ)
(τ − σ2s)2
×{
1− (1− ω1)φµσ
2
d
ω1 (φµ(σ2d +Q) +Q)
exp
{
(φµ+ 1)Q|hrs|2
τ − σ2s
}}
.
(34)
We note that ω1P−1B
(
φµ
(
σ2d +Q
)
+Q
) |hrs|2κ2(τ)/(τ −
σ2s )
2 > 0 due to σ2s < τ and κ2(τ) > 0 as given in Theorem 1.
As such, without the constraint τ ≤ ρ1, the value of τ that
ensures ∂(ξ)/∂τ = 0 in (34) is given by τ‡. We note that
∂(ξ)/∂τ < 0, for τ < τ‡, and ∂(ξ)/∂τ > 0, for τ > τ‡. This
is due to the term exp{(φµ+ 1)Q|hrs|2/(τ − σ2s )} in (34)
is monotonically decreasing with respect to τ . This indicates
that τ‡ minimizes ξ without the constraint τ ≤ ρ1. We also
note that ξ given in (32) is a not a continuous function of
τ following Theorem 1 when τ‡ ≤ σ2s . This is due to that
1 − ω1 − P−1B [(1 − ω1)κ1(τ) − ω1κ2(τ)] is monotonically
increasing with respect to τ when τ‡ ≤ σ2s . We note that
ξ is also monotonically increasing with respect to τ for
ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ2, thus will lead to ω1 ≥ 1 − ω1. As such, if
τ‡ ≤ σ2s , the optimal threshold is τ∗ = ρ1.. If τ‡ > σ2s ,
following (33) and noting ξ is a continuous function of τ , we
can conclude that the optimal threshold is τ∗ = min
{
τ‡, ρ1
}
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Following Theorem 2, we obtain the minimum detection
error probability at S in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The minimum value of ξ at S is
ξ∗ =


(1− ω1)
{
1− exp
(
µσ2d
Pmaxr
)
×(
1− φµσ2d
φµσ2
d
+(φµ+1)Q
)
×(
ω1
1−ω1
(
1 + (φµ+1)Q
φµσ2
d
))− φµσ2d
(φµ+1)Q
}
, τ∗ = τ‡,
ω1 exp
{
− (φµ+1)QφPmaxr
}
, τ∗ = ρ1.
(35)
Proof: Substituting τ∗ into (32), we obtain the minimum
value of ξ as ξ∗ = 1− ω1 − P−1B [(1− ω1)κ1(τ) − ω1κ2(τ)],
which completes the proof of Corollary 1.
Based on Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Corollary 1, we draw
the following useful insights.
Remark 1: We conclude that detection error probability ξ∗
tends to 0 when R’s additional covert power Q approaches
infinity. This follows from (27) for τ∗ = ρ1, since when Q→
∞ we have τ‡ < σ2s as per (28) and thus τ∗ = ρ1.
Remark 2: When the maximum power constraint Pmaxr
approaches infinity, the minimum detection error probability
ξ∗ approaches a fixed value given by
lim
Pmax
b
→∞
ξ∗ =
1
2
{
1−
(
1− φµσ
2
d
φµσ2d + (φµ+ 1)Q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1(Q)
×
(
1 +
(φµ+ 1)Q
φµσ2d
)− φµσ2d
(φµ+1)Q
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2(Q)
}
. (36)
The result in (36) follows from (27) for τ∗ = τ‡, since
when Pmaxr → ∞ we have ρ1 → ∞ as per (24) and thus
ρ1 > τ
‡ (then τ∗ = τ‡). Following (36), we can conclude
that ξ∗ monotonically decreases with Q when Pmaxr → ∞.
In order to prove this conclusion, we next prove that f2(Q)
in (36) monotonically increases with Q, since f1(Q) in
(36) is a monotonically increasing function of Q. Defining
(φµ+ 1)Q/µσ2d = x, following (35) we have f2(Q) = f2(x),
where
f2(x) = (1 + x)
−1/x. (37)
In order to determine the monotonicity of f2(x) with respect
to x, we derive its first derivative as
∂f2(x)
∂x
= exp
{
− ln(1 + x)
x
}
(1 + x) ln(1 + x)− x
x2(1 + x)
. (38)
We note that whether ∂f2(x)/∂x > 0 or ∂f2(x)/∂x < 0
depends on g(x) , (1+ x) ln(1 + x)− x. As such, we derive
the first derivative of g(x) with respect to x as
∂g(x)
∂x
= ln(1 + x). (39)
Noting that x ≥ 0 and ∂g(x)/∂x ≥ 0, we conclude that
g(x) monotonically decreases with x. Then, we have g(x) ≥
g(0) = 0 and thus ∂f2(x)/∂x ≥ 0. This leads to that f2(Q)
monotonically increases with Q and thus ξ∗ monotonically
8decreases with Q for τ∗ = τ‡.
When Pmaxr → ∞, ω1 approaches 1/2 as per (29) and ξ∗ =
ω1 − ǫ can be written as(
1− φµσ
2
d
φµσ2d + (φµ+ 1)Q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1(Q)
(
1 +
(φµ+ 1)Q
φµσ2d
)− φµσ2d
(φµ+1)Q
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2(Q)
= 2ǫ. (40)
Defining y = φµσ2d/((φµ+ 1)Q) and following the expres-
sion of f2(Q) in (40), we have
lim
y→0
f2(Q) = lim
y→0
(
y
y + 1
)y
= 00 = 1. (41)
As per (40), for y → 0 the approximated close-form expres-
sion of Qǫ is given by
Qǫ =
φµσ2d
(φµ+ 1)
(
1
1− 2ǫ − 1
)
. (42)
Remark 3: We have that the minimum detection error
probability ξ∗ tends to 0 when the data transmission rate Rsd
approaches 0 or infinity. As Rsd → 0, as per (5) we have
µ→ 0 and thus τ‡ → σ2s (then optimal threshold τ∗ is equal
to τ‡) following (28). Then, from (35) for τ∗ = τ‡ we can see
that ξ∗ → 0 as µ→ 0. As Rsd →∞, following (5) again we
note that µ will be negative and thus the transmission from S
to D fails, which leads to ξ∗ → 0 as discussed in Section III-A.
This result means that there exists an optimal value of Rsd that
maximizes ξ∗ and thus maximizes the effective covert rate for
given other system parameters. We will numerically examine
the impact of Rsd on covert communications in Section V.
D. Optimization of Effective Covert Rate
In this section, we examine the effective covert rate achieved
in the considered system subject to a covert constraint.
1) Effective Covert Rate: From (11), the SINR of xc at D
in the rate-control transmission scheme is given as
γ∆ =
P∆|hrd|2
P 1r |hrd|2G2σ2r + σ2d
=
Q
µ(Q+σ2
d
)
η|hsr|2+1
+ σ2d
, (43)
where η , Ps/σ2r . Then, the covert rate achieved by R is
R∆ = log2(1+γ∆). As such, we can see that the covert rate is
fixed when Q is fixed as per (43). We next derive the effective
covert rate, i.e., the covert rate averaged over all realizations
of |hrd|2, in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The achievable effective covert rate Rc by R in
the rate-control transmission scheme is derived as a function
of Q given by
Rc = R∆PC = log2

1 + Q
µ(Q+σ2
d
)
η|hsr|2+1
+ σ2d

×
exp
{
−µσ
2
d + µQ+Q
Pmaxr
}
. (44)
Based on Theorem 3, we note that Rc is not an increasing
function of Q and thus R∆, since as Q increases R∆ increases
as per (44) while PC decreases following (21). This indicates
that there may exists an optimal value of Q that maximizes
the effective covert rate, which motivates our following opti-
mization of Q in the considered system model.
2) Maximization of Rc with the Covert Constraint: As per
(30) and (31), note that ω1 ≤ 1/2, the covert constraint is
given by
ξ∗ ≥ min {1− ω, ω} − ǫ = ω1 − ǫ. (45)
Following Theorem 2, the optimal value of Q that maxi-
mizes Rc subject to the covert constraint ξ
∗ ≥ ω1 − ǫ can be
obtained through numerical search, which is given by
Q∗ =argmax
Q
Rc, (46)
s.t. ξ∗ ≥ ω1 − ǫ.
We note that the optimization problem (46) is of one dimen-
sion, which can be solved by efficient numerical search. The
maximum value of Rc is then achieved by substituting Q
∗ into
(44), which is denoted by R∗c .
IV. POWER-CONTROL TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In this section, we consider the power-control transmission
scheme, in which R transmits a covert message to D with
a constant transmit power if possible. Specifically, we first
determine R’s transmit power in H1 and then analyze the
detection error probability at S, based on which we also derive
S’s optimal detection threshold. Furthermore, we derive the ef-
fective covert rate achieved by the power-control transmission
scheme.
A. Transmit Power at Relay
Following (9), when Csd = Rsd we have
P 1r = µP∆ +
µσ2d
|hrd|2 . (47)
We note that Csd = Rsd requires C
∗
sd ≥ Rsd and thus
|hrd|2 ≥ µσ2d/[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆]. Considering the maxi-
mum power constraint at R (i.e., P 1r + P∆ ≤ Pmaxr under
this case), R has to give up the transmission of the covert
message (i.e., P∆ = 0) when P
1
r > P
max
r − P∆ and sets
P 1r the same as P
0
r given in (6). This is due to the fact that
S knows hrs and it can detect the covert transmission with
probability one when the total transmit power of R is greater
than Pmaxr . Then, the transmit power of xr under H1 for the
power-control transmission scheme is given by
P 1r =


µP∆ +
µσ2d
|hrd|2
, |hrd|2 ≥ µσ
2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
,
µσ2d
|hrd|2
,
µσ2d
Pmaxr
≤ |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
,
0, |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
.
(48)
As per (48), we note that R also does not transmit a covert
message when it cannot support the transmission from S to D
(i.e., when |hrd|2 < µσ2d/Pmaxr ). This is due to the fact that a
9transmission outage occurs when |hrd|2 < µσ2d/Pmaxr and R
or D would request a retransmission from S, which enables S
to detect R’s covert transmission with probability one if this
covert transmission happened, since R cannot and thus does
not forward S’s information to D when |hrd|2 < µσ2d/Pmaxr .
In summary, R could possibly transmit a covert message
without being detected only when the condition |hrd|2 ≥
µσ2d/[P
max
r − (µ+ 1)P∆] is guaranteed. We again denote this
necessary condition for covert communication as C. Noting
F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x, the probability that C is guaranteed is
given by
PC = exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
}
. (49)
We note that PC is a monotonically decreasing function of
P∆, which indicates that the probability that R can transmit a
covert message (without being detected with probability one)
decreases as P∆ increases. Following (47) and noting P
1
r +
P∆ ≤ Pmaxr , we have Pmaxr > (µ+ 1)P∆.
B. Detection Error Probability at Source
In this subsection, we derive S’s false alarm rate, i.e., α =
P(D1|H0), and miss detection rate, i.e., β = P(D0|H1).
Theorem 4: When the condition B is guaranteed, for a given
τ , the false alarm and miss detection rates at S are derived as
α =


1, τ < σ2s ,
1− P−1B κ1(τ), σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ1,
0, τ > ρ1,
(50)
β =


0, τ < ρ3,
P−1B κ3(τ), ρ3 ≤ τ ≤ ρ4,
1, τ > ρ4,
(51)
where
ρ3 , (φµ+ 1)P∆|hrs|2 + σ2s ,
ρ4 , (Pmaxr φ+ (φµ+ 1)P∆) |hrs|2 + σ2s ,
κ3(τ) , exp
{
−φµσ
2
d|hrs|2
τ − ρ3
}
,
and ρ1 and κ1(τ) are defined in (24).
Proof: Considering the maximum power constraint at R
under H0 (i.e., P 0r ≤ Pmaxr ) and following (6), (16), and (17),
the false alarm rate under the condition B is given by
α = P
[
µσ2d
|hrd|2 |hrs|
2φ+ σ2s ≥ τ
∣∣B]
=


1, τ < σ2s ,
P
[
µσ2d
Pmaxr
≤|hrd|2≤ µσ
2
d|hrs|
2φ
τ−σ2s
]
P−1B , σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ1,
0, τ > ρ1.
(52)
Then, substituting F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x into the above
equation we achieve the desired result in (50).
We first clarify that we have ρ3 < ρ4. Then, considering the
maximum power constraint at R under H1 (i.e., P 1r + P∆ ≤
Pmaxr ) and following, (16), (17), and (48), the miss detection
rate under the condition B is given by
β = P
[(
µP∆ +
µσ2d
|hrd|2
)
|hrs|2φ+ P∆|hrs|2 + σ2s < τ
∣∣B]
=


0, τ < ρ3,
P
[
|hrd|2≥ φµσ
2
d|hrs|
2
τ−(φµ+1)P∆|hrs|2−σ2s
]
P−1B , ρ3 ≤ τ ≤ ρ4,
1, τ > ρ4.
(53)
Then, substituting F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x into the above
equation we achieve the desired result in (51).
We note that the false alarm and miss detection rates given
in Theorem 4 are functions of the threshold τ and we examine
how S sets the value of τ to minimize its detection error
probability in the following subsection.
C. Optimization of the Detection Threshold at Source
In this subsection, we first derive a constraint (i.e., an upper
bound) on P∆ to ensure a non-zero detection error probability
at S. Then, under this constraint we derive the lower and upper
bounds on the optimal value of τ that minimizes the detection
error probability ξ for the power-control transmission scheme.
Theorem 5: R’s transmit power of the covert message P∆
should satisfy
P∆ ≤ Pu∆ ,
φPmaxr
φµ+ 1
(54)
in order to guarantee ξ > 0 and when (54) is guaranteed the
optimal τ at S that minimizes ξ should satisfy ρ3 ≤ τ∗ ≤ ρ1.
Proof: As discussed before, S will perform detection
whenever condition B is met. In our work, we assume that
R will transmit a covert message with probability 50% when
C is guaranteed. As per (7) and (49), the probability P(H1)
is given by
P(H1) = 1
2
P(C∣∣B) = ω2, (55)
where
ω2 ,
1
2
exp
{
− µ(µ+ 1)σ
2
dP∆
(Pmaxr (P
max
r − (µ+ 1)P∆))
}
. (56)
Then, P(H0) is given by
P(H0) = 1− P(H1) = 1− ω2. (57)
When ρ1 < ρ3 that requires P∆ > φP
max
r /(φµ+ 1) as per
Theorem 4, following (50) and (51), we have
ξ =


1− ω2, τ ≤ σ2s ,
(1− ω2)
(
1− P−1B κ1(τ)
)
, σ2s < τ < ρ1,
0, ρ1 ≤ τ ≤ ρ3,
ω2P−1B κ3(τ), ρ3 < τ < ρ4,
ω2, τ ≥ ρ4.
(58)
This indicates that S can simply set τ ∈ [ρ1, ρ3] to ensure
ξ = 0 when P∆ > φP
max
r /(φµ + 1), i.e., S can detect the
covert transmission with probability one. As such, P∆ should
satisfy (54) in order to guarantee ξ > 0.
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We next prove ρ3 ≤ τ∗ ≤ ρ1. When P∆ ≤ φPmaxr /(φµ +
1), i.e., ρ3 < ρ1, following (50) and (51), we have
ξ =


1− ω2, τ ≤ σ2s ,
(1− ω2)
(
1− P−1B κ1(τ)
)
, σ2s < τ ≤ ρ3,
1− ω2 − P−1B ×
[(1− ω2)κ1(τ) − ω2κ3(τ)] , ρ3 < τ < ρ1,
ω2P−1B κ3(τ), ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ4,
ω2, τ ≥ ρ4.
(59)
Obviously, S will not set τ ≤ σ2s or τ ≥ ρ4, since ξ = 1−ω1
or ω1 are the worst case for S.
For σ2s < τ ≤ ρ3, we derive the first derivative of ξ with
respect to τ as
∂(ξ)
∂τ
= − (1− ω2)P
−1
B φµσ
2
d|hrs|2
(τ − σ2s )2
κ1(τ) < 0. (60)
This demonstrates that ξ is a decreasing function of τ when
σ2s < τ ≤ ρ3. For ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ4, we derive the first derivative
of ξ with respect to τ as
∂(ξ)
∂τ
=
ω2P−1B φµσ2d|hrs|2
(τ − ρ3)2 κ3(τ) > 0. (61)
This proves that ξ is an increasing function of τ when
ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ4. Noting that ξ is a continuous function of τ and
considering (60) and (61), we can conclude that τ∗ should
satisfy ρ3 ≤ τ∗ ≤ ρ1, no mater what is the value of ξ for
ρ3 < τ < ρ1.
The lower and upper bounds on τ∗ given in Theorem 5
significantly facilitate the numerical search for τ∗ at S. Then,
following Theorem 5 and (59), τ∗ can be obtained through
τ∗ = argmin
ρ3≤τ≤ρ1
{
1− ω2 − P−1B [(1− ω2)κ1(τ) − ω2κ3(τ)]
}
.
(62)
Substituting τ∗ into (59), we can obtain the minimum detec-
tion error probability ξ∗ for the power-control transmission
scheme.
D. Optimization of Effective Covert Rate
In this section, we examine the effective covert rate achieved
by the power-control transmission scheme subject to the covert
constraint.
1) Effective Covert Rate: Following (11), the SINR at
destination for covert communication is given as
γ∆ =
P∆|hrd|2
P 1r |hrd|2G2σ2r + σ2d
=
P∆(η|hsr|2 + 1)|hrd|2
µP∆|hrd|2 + (η|hsr|2 + µ+ 1)σ2d
. (63)
Then, the covert rate achieved by R is R∆ = log2(1+γ∆). We
next derive the effective covert rate, i.e., averaged R∆ over all
realizations of |hrd|2, in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: The achievable effective covert rate Rc by R
with the power-control transmission scheme is derived as a
function of P∆ given by
Rc =
1
ln 2
exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
}
×[
ln
(
β1
β2
)
+ e
β2
α2Ei
(
−β2
α2
)
− e
β1
α1Ei
(
−β1
α1
)]
, (64)
where
β1 , [η|hsr|2 + µ+ 1](Pmaxr − P∆)σ2d,
β2 ,
{
η|hsr|2 + µ+ 1
[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆]−1
+ µ2P∆
}
σ2d,
α1 , P∆
[
η|hsr |2 + (µ+ 1)
]
[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆] ,
α2 , µP∆[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆],
and the exponential integral function Ei(·) is given by
Ei(x) = −
∫ ∞
−x
e−t
t
dt, [x < 0]. (65)
Proof: A positive covert rate is only achievable under the
condition C and thus Rc is given by
Rc =
∫ ∞
µσ2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
R∆f(|hrd|2)d|hrd|2
a
=
1
ln 2
exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
}
×∫ ∞
0
ln
(
β1 + α1x
β2 + α2x
)
e−xdx, (66)
where
a
= is achieved by setting x = |hrd|2 −
µσ2d/[P
max
r − (µ+ 1)P∆]. We then solve the integral in (66)
with the aid of [32, Eq. (4.337.1)]∫ ∞
0
e−νx ln(θ + x)dx =
1
ν
[
ln θ + eνθEi(−θν)] , (67)
and achieve the result given in (64).
Based on Theorem 6, we note that Rc is not an increasing
function of P∆, since as P∆ increases R∆ increases but
PC (i.e., the probability that the condition C is guaranteed)
decreases. This motivates our following optimization of P∆
in order to maximize the effective covert rate subject to the
covert constraint.
2) Maximization of Rc with the Covert Constraint: As per
(55) and (57), note that ω2 ≤ 1/2, the covert constraint is
given by
ξ∗ ≥ min {1− ω, ω} − ǫ = ω2 − ǫ. (68)
Following Theorem 5 the optimal value of P∆ that maxi-
mizes Rc subject to this constraint can be obtained through
P ∗∆ = argmax
0≤P∆≤Pu∆
Rc (69)
s.t. ξ∗ ≥ ω2 − ǫ.
We note that this is a two-dimensional optimization problem
that can be solved by efficient numerical searches. Specifically,
for each given P∆, ξ
∗ should be obtained based on (62) where
τ∗ is also numerically searched. We note that the numerical
search of P ∗∆ and τ
∗ is efficient since their lower and upper
bounds are explicitly given. The maximum value of Rc is
denoted by R∗c .
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Fig. 2. (a) ξ∗ versus Pmaxr with different value of σ
2
d
for the rate-
control transmission scheme, where Ps = 10 dB, σ
2
r = 0 dB, Rsd =
1 bits per channel use, |hsr|2 = |hrs|2 = 1, and Q = 0.1. (b) ξ∗ versus
Rsd with different value of σ
2
d
for the rate-control transmission scheme, where
Ps = P
max
r = 10 dB, σ
2
r = 0 dB, |hsr|
2 = |hrs|2 = 1, and Q = 0.1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present numerical results to verify
our analysis on the performance of covert communications
in relay networks. Then, we provide a thorough performance
comparison between the rate-control and power-control trans-
mission schemes. Based on our examination, we draw many
useful insights with regard to the impact of some system
parameters (e.g., Pmaxr , Rsd, and ǫ ) on covert communications
in wireless relay networks.
A. Rate-Control Transmission Scheme
In Fig. 2 (a), we plot the minimum detection error prob-
ability ξ∗ versus R’s maximum transmit power Pmaxr and
observe that ξ∗ increases with Pmaxr . This shows that the
covert transmission becomes easier as the desired performance
of the normal transmission increases, since the transmission
outage probability decreases with Pmaxr for a fixed Rsd. We
also observe ξ∗ approach to a specific value as Pmaxr → ∞,
which is discussed in Remark 2. This observation demonstrates
that the covert transmission can still be possibly detected by
S even without the maximum power constraint at R. In Fig. 2
(b), we plot ξ∗ versus the transmission rate from S to D (i.e.,
Rsd). We first observe that ξ
∗ is not a monotonic function
of Rsd and ξ
∗ → 0 as Rsd → 0 or Rsd → ∞. This
observation indicates that there may exist an optimal value
of Rsd that maximizes ξ
∗. In Fig. 2, we finally observe that
ξ∗ is a monotonic increasing function of σ2d .
B. Power-Control Transmission Scheme
In Fig. 3 (a), we plot the minimum detection error prob-
ability ξ∗ versus R’s maximum transmit power Pmaxr and
observe that ξ∗ increases with Pmaxr . This shows that the
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Fig. 3. (a) ξ∗ versus Pmaxr with different value of σ
2
d
for the power-
control transmission scheme, where Ps = 10 dB, σ
2
r = 0 dB, Rsd =
1 bits per channel use, |hsr|2 = |hrs|2 = 1, and P∆ = −10 dB. (b)
ξ∗ versus Rsd with different value of σ
2
d
for the power-control transmission
scheme, where Ps = P
max
r = 10 dB, σ
2
r = 0 dB, |hsr|
2 = |hrs|2 = 1,
and P∆ = −10 dB.
covert transmission becomes easier as the desired performance
of the normal transmission increases, since the transmission
outage probability decreases with Pmaxr for a fixed Rsd.
We also observe ξ∗ does not approach 1/2 (but a specific
value that is lower than 1/2) as Pmaxr → ∞, which is the
same as the result discussed in Remark 2 for the rate-control
transmission scheme. This observation demonstrates that the
covert transmission can still be possibly detected by S even
without the maximum power constraint at R. Fig. 3 (b), we
plot ξ∗ versus the transmission rate from S to D (i.e., Rsd). We
first observe that ξ∗ is not a monotonic function of Rsd and
ξ∗ → 0 as Rsd → 0 or Rsd →∞. This observation indicates
that there may exist an optimal value of Rsd that maximizes
ξ∗. In Fig. 3, we finally observe that ξ∗ is not a monotonic
function of σ2d.
C. Performance Comparisons between the Rate-Control and
Power-Control Transmission Schemes
Fig. 4 illustrates R∗c versus P
max
r with different values of Ps
for the rate-control and power-control transmission schemes
using (46) and (69), respectively. In this figure, we first observe
that for both schemes R∗c monotonically increases as P
max
r in-
creases, which demonstrates that the covert message becomes
easier to be transmitted when more power is available at R.
we also observe that R∗c is not a monotonic function of Ps. In
Fig. 4, it illustrates that the power-control transmission scheme
outperforms the rate-control transmission scheme when Pmaxr
is in the low regime. However, when Pmaxr is larger than some
specific values (e.g., when Pmaxr ≥ 13 dB), the performance
of rate-control transmission scheme is better than that of the
power-control transmission scheme. This is mainly due to
the fact that the transmit power constraints are not limits of
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2
r = σ
2
d
= 0 dB,
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5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Fig. 5. R∗c versus Ps under different value of P
max
r , where σ
2
r = σ
2
d
= 0 dB,
ǫ = 0.1, and Rsd = 1.5 bits per channel use.
the covert transmission when Pmaxr is large, and thus under
this case selecting a proper covert transmission rate (in the
rate-control transmission scheme) can gain more benefit. We
note that this observation demonstrates the significance of our
work, since with our analysis R can easily determine which
transmission is better under the specific system settings.
In Fig. 5, we plot the averaged maximum effective covert
rate, i.e., R∗c , which is achieved by averaging R
∗
c over |hsr|2,
versus S’s transmit power Ps with different values of R’s
maximum transmit power Pmaxr . In this figure, we first observe
that R∗c is zero when Ps is effectively small (e.g., due to the
fact that S is far from R and D). This is due to the fact that
when Ps is sufficient small, the normal transmission from
S to D with the fixed rate Rsd may not be supported and
R does not forward S’s information to D. Meanwhile, the
covert transmission from R to D cannot be achieved due to
the lack of the shield from the normal transmission. We also
observe that R∗c → 0 when Ps → ∞. This is due to the
fact that φ given in (17) decreases (and thus P 0r |hrs|2φ and
P 1r |hrs|2φ decrease) with Ps, which leads to a lower detection
error probability at S as per (35) and (62) (i.e., it becomes
easier for S to detect the covert transmission). In Fig. 5, we
further observe that the achieved R∗c decreases significantly
as Pmaxr decreases (e.g., when R is with less transmit power
than S), which demonstrates that it is the power constraint at R
that mainly limits the performance of the covert transmission.
Based on this observation, we can predict that R∗c → 0 when
Pmaxr → 0. This is due to the fact that as Pmaxr → 0 R
cannot support the normal transmission from S to D, not to
mention the covert transmission from itself to D (due to the
lack of the shield). Finally, we observe that the power-control
transmission scheme outperforms the rate-control transmission
scheme when Ps or P
max
r is low. This observation is consistent
with that found in Fig. 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work examined covert communication in one-way
relay networks over quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels, in
which R opportunistically transmits its own information to
the destination covertly on top of forwarding S’s message
in AF mode, while S tries to detect this covert transmission.
Specifically, we proposed the rate-control and power-control
transmission schemes for R to convey covert information to
D. We analyzed S’s detection limits of the covert transmission
from R to D in terms of the detection error probability
and determined the achievable effective covert rates subject
to ξ∗ ≥ min{1 − ω, ω} − ǫ for these two schemes. Our
examination showed that the rate-control transmission scheme
outperforms the power-control transmission scheme under
some specific conditions, and otherwise the power-control
transmission scheme outperforms the rate-control transmis-
sion scheme. As such, our conducted analysis enabled R to
switch between these two strategies to achieve the maximum
covert rate. Our investigation also demonstrated that covert
communication in the considered relay networks is feasible
and the effective covert rate achieved by R increases with its
forwarding ability.
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